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## TENDENCIES IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY SINCE DISRAELI<sup>1</sup>

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In April, 1880, the conservative ministry which had held office for six years resigned. Of that ministry Benjamin Disraeli, Lord Beaconsfield, had been the dominating spirit as well as the official head. But at the end Disraeli's government did not leave a clean slate. Indeed for the next thirty years successive British cabinets were compelled to deal with problems and policies unwillingly bequeathed to them by that ardent and imperious mind. What were then, in 1880, the major problems of foreign and colonial policy left unsolved? Secondly, have any of them been solved? And are there now new questions? So, may appear to us who sit and watch some characteristics or tendencies of recent British foreign policy.

But this is a large order for a short twenty minutes. The additional difficulty is lack of essential material. When at last the day of resurrection comes for documents now securely enclosed in archives, when the natural reticence of men who have made history has ended, when in turn the student has gained perspective, the time may come really to know and to judge more intelligently of the matters before us. Indeed, the dubious yet exciting character of this adventure is only emphasized by Mr. Dooley's advice on the writing of history:

Don't make any foolish bets on Histhry . . . . Th' further ye get away fr'm anny peeryod th' better ye can write about it. Ye are not subject to interruptions by people that were there.

But, whatever the result, on such an historical holiday it may be pleasant even to run risks.

So, first, we find three regional problems, in one sense limited by geography, in another sense extended by human policies and geo-

<sup>1</sup> A paper prepared for the joint session of the American Historical and Political Associations at the Waldorf-Astoria on December 29, 1909, in celebration of the Centennial of Mr. Gladstone's birth.

graphic connections to the realm of world politics. Thus there was, in 1880, the Egyptian question, in which African, Asiatic, and European interests were involved. Here itching palms of anxious foreign bondholders pressed on the shoulders of statesmen. On high in Egypt there had been riot of financial orgy, while at the bottom still toiled the *fellah*, the laborer, who did the work and was not paid. Meanwhile many waited, expectantly hoping that racial and religious fanaticism, the intrigues of military cliques, and international rivalry might shortly combine to hide naked yet entangled facts.

Thirty years ago this special British interest in the Egyptian question had been significantly shown in at least three instances. In 1875, the British government, partly through the inspiration of Disraeli, purchased from the Khedive a large block of shares in the Suez Canal, the "spinal cord" of the empire.<sup>2</sup> Soon the tangle of Egyptian finance grew tighter. And in 1879 Great Britain shared in forcing the abdication of the Khedive Ismail. Later a French and a British controller-general of Egyptian finance were appointed; the Egyptian authorities, by the decree of November 15, 1879, could not remove *either* without the consent of his home government.<sup>3</sup> Despite these facts, Lord Cromer has laid the "main responsibility for the British occupation" of Egypt on the incoming liberal ministry.<sup>4</sup> But these three facts, emerging from a mass of supporting material, demonstrate to me the essential truth of Mr. Gladstone's contention in 1882 that British "political control" in Egypt, by reason of intervention before 1880, had become, if not a reality, certainly a permanent matter of practical politics.<sup>5</sup> The fact that foreign control in Egypt was then shared by France does not affect the question of British cabinet responsibility. Here then was an inherited problem, and one destined to rapid growth.

But the history of the Egyptian question is well known. Here we need only a summary. In 1881, an Egyptian military revolt, affected by nationalistic ideas, led to the occupation of Egypt by British troops acting in the name of the Khedive. Anglo-French coöperation slowly changed to rivalry. Then followed the patient yet varying development of British administrative policies till Egypt was practi-

<sup>2</sup> Parliamentary Papers (hereafter to be cited as P. P.). Cd. 1391. Egypt. No. 1, (1876) p. 7. 177,642 shares were purchased.

<sup>3</sup> P. P. Cd. 2549. Egypt No. 1 (1880), p. 138.

<sup>4</sup> Cromer: *Modern Egypt*. I. p. 161.

<sup>5</sup> Hansard. 3d Series, vol. 272, pp. 2094-2103 (July 27, 1882).

cally a British protectorate. The recovery of the Sudan, in 1898, was possibly stimulated by Italian reverses in Abyssinia and by the dread of a French flanking advance from the southwest.<sup>6</sup> In Abyssinia there had been also a Russian mission.<sup>7</sup> At all events, Englishmen felt that they had at last a memorial to Gordon. But, whatever opinion one may hold as to British policy on this or that occasion, most men will now agree as to the present success of British control in Egypt. From an imperial as well as a local point of view it is essential. Here, then, is a tangled matter, which, from the British point of view, has at last reached a fortunate stage.

Meanwhile, at the other end of Africa, a second regional problem was developing. In the Transvaal sullen farmers, perplexed and militant, were faced by policies which they did not understand. Nor did many men then understand the farmers. The annexation of the Transvaal in 1877, and the natural dissatisfaction of the Boers, had, in 1880, led to war.<sup>8</sup> This difficult problem was soon further aggravated by British defeats. Whether wisely or no, Mr. Gladstone's government, faced by a problem which it had not created, decided to reverse the Disraelian policy and in the face of defeat bravely to offer peace. The subsequent arrangements, while asserting a doctrine of "permanent interest" by the British, did not continue the British claim to regulate the government of the Transvaal.<sup>9</sup> Nearly twenty years passed, and then, on both sides, the cumulative effect of past memories and present interests again resulted in war. But we now see the final and costly British victory both crowned and hidden by a solution which reflects honor on present compatriots who were so lately antagonists. The South African constitution, interesting to the historian and important to the political scientist, is to be the subject of a later paper at this session. I congratulate Mr. Fisher on his subject. Today, however, we can remember that in May, 1881, Mr. Gladstone declared that South African confederation was then the "pole-star" of the action of his government.<sup>10</sup> And thus we have

<sup>6</sup> *Annual Register*, 1896, pp. 371-72. Cf. Rose: *The Development of the European Nations*. II. pp. 224, 227.

<sup>7</sup> *Annual Register*, 1897, p. 378.

<sup>8</sup> British and Foreign State Papers (hereafter to be cited as S. P.), vol. 68, p. 140.

<sup>9</sup> Convention of August 3, 1881. S. P. vol. 72, p. 900. Convention of February 27, 1884. S. P. vol. 75, p. 5.

<sup>10</sup> Morley: *Gladstone*. III p. 23.

a second example of a tangled problem, bequeathed in 1880, but which in 1910, after varied policies, is likely to secure a temperate solution.

Now, thirdly, there is Afghanistan, an Asiatic land of mountain ranges embattled between England and Russia, the two transcontinental Eurasian empires. In 1875, the problem here had developed through the determination of the British government to force an exhibition of British interests in Afghanistan.<sup>11</sup> This was in answer to real threats of increased Russian influence. In 1879, however, the result again was war. British victory, after dark days, then stirred the desire to expand, in particular to partition Afghanistan and to place the southwest under some form of British control. The difficult question, therefore, was whether gallantly to retire or with reckless optimism to grab for what the future, in wiser fashion, might still essentially secure. The royal speech of January, 1881, answered the question, announcing the evacuation, by the British, of Kandahar, the capital of southwestern Afghanistan.<sup>12</sup> That tumultuous country was to be left practically intact under a king who knew how to rule. Here, then, was a prompt and flat reversal of the policy urged by representatives of the previous British government. And now there have been nearly thirty years of peace with Afghanistan. British influence in that region has, meanwhile, created a relatively effective sphere of influence, if not a protectorate. This condition, which has slowly yet naturally developed from the decision announced in 1881, has been further demonstrated, or at least temporarily endorsed, by the recent Anglo-Russian agreement. And today the Indian border is comparatively and fortunately quiet, while unrest troubles Calcutta, Lahore or Puna. The Central Asian question therefore, although probably not solved, is at least more quiescent than in Disraeli's day.

But are these three regional problems typical? Must we not also turn to other aspects of recent British foreign policy, to another group of questions, wider in range, yet more direct, perhaps more menacing in their possibilities? At least we can ask a few questions concerning the development during the last thirty years of Anglo-French, Anglo-Russian, and Anglo-German relations. Here are interests which from time to time suddenly focus in a given region or

<sup>11</sup> Salisbury to Gov.-Gen. of India. Jan. 22, 1875. P. P. Cd. 2190. Afghanistan (1878-79) p. 128.

<sup>12</sup> Hansard: 3d Series vol. 252, p. 4.

because of a particular incident. But continuity and range are also here. Such matters utilize geography and illuminate or give character to political detail. The weary traditions of diplomacy and the long forces of economics both have their part.

Anglo-French relations, in the first place, might claim an amicable start, for in 1890 both powers had apparently a fairly common policy in Egypt. Tunis was shortly to be occupied by France, probably with an earlier intimation of British acquiescence.<sup>13</sup> But the results of Napoleon's Egyptian expedition were prophetic; and amity in Egypt was to prove a dream. The rivalries of the two powers had no rest. On the coast of Newfoundland, in West Africa, in the valley of the Nile, even on the boundaries of Siam, there were to be anxious questions. Meanwhile the tantalizing advance of the Franco-Russian alliance served finally to underscore a hostility reminiscent of the 18th century. Indeed, during the last Boer war the clamor of the French public, resentful at late rebuffs, possibly also the elusive thoughts of the French government, suggested another struggle with England, the modern Carthage.<sup>14</sup> In the face of such hostility, the statesmen of both countries nevertheless made progress toward a peaceful understanding. In 1899, an agreement was reached as to African boundaries,<sup>15</sup> and in 1904 as to Newfoundland fisheries.<sup>16</sup> Under these auspices, the Anglo-French *entente cordiale* made its way into a politely interested society.<sup>17</sup> The opportunities given by events in Morocco, and by the Algesiras conference of 1906, were well utilized.<sup>18</sup> It is true, this amicable situation may not last many years. But now we see, on the part of England, a policy which does not irritate her neighbor, on the part of France a willingness, as far as England is concerned, to live in the world as it is. On both sides there is a wary yet optimistic inclination to let by-gones be by-gones. Is not this a gain?

Anglo-Russian relations have in turn a somewhat similar trend. But here events more often crowd closer to the edge of war, possibly because of a more natural recent inheritance of animosity. These

<sup>13</sup> Fitzmaurice: *Granville*, II. p. 234.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *Daily Telegraph*, Oct. 28, 1908 (Interview with the kaiser).

<sup>15</sup> March 21, 1899, S. P. vol. 91, p. 55.

<sup>16</sup> Dec. 8, 1904, P. P. Cd. 2383. Treaty Series, No. 5. (1905).

<sup>17</sup> April 8, 1904, P. P. Cd. 2384 and 2385. Treaty Series, Nos. 6 and 7. (1905).

<sup>18</sup> April 7, 1906. P. P. Cd. 3302. Treaty Series, No. 4 (1907).

relations furthermore have, in large part, concentrated in Asia; and this concentration, if such a word can be used with reference to a continent, has thus tended to clarify and intensify the issue. In the first place, Disraeli's government was, in large part, responsible for the checks endured by Russia in 1878, after she had won military and diplomatic victories from Turkey. Moreover, the natural regrets of Russia, after the Congress of Berlin, had bred schemes of revenge. Here, then, the liberal ministry was undoubtedly a legatee. The forces set loose by this opposition of Anglo-Russian interests were already clearly shown in the Afghan situation.<sup>19</sup> The lively degree of Russian hostility was further exhibited in 1885 by her occupation of Penjdeh in Afghan territory. And this event was finely timed to follow the news of Gordon's death at Khartum in January, and the consequent loss of the Sudan.<sup>20</sup> We can now recall how 18th century diplomacy resorted to schemes of joint partition to preserve the balance of power and to satisfy political ambitions. Today, although the map has grown, the principle of compensation and indemnification still lives, however unwillingly it may be occasionally agreed to by one or the other of the interested parties. Although British continuance in Egypt might not justify Russian advance in Central Asia, it could, however, at the very least, be utilized if not proclaimed as an excuse. At all events, the British government did not then regard, nor has it since regarded the actual Russian military and railway advance in Asia as reason for an ultimatum or for war. The critics of British policy have with some reason declared it to be perversely blind as to an ultimate hope by Russia to invade India. But the successful work, during the last twenty odd years, of various Asiatic boundary commissions has partially silenced these critics. Indeed, the whole situation was, at least for the time, radically altered by the failure of Japanese negotiations with Russia in 1901, and the formation in the next year of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which was three years later renewed and extended.<sup>21</sup> The larger problem, however, still remains. We know that a check to Russian plans in one Asiatic field has often led to renewed activity in other directions. After Russian defeats in Manchuria, therefore, the world eagerly learned of an Anglo-Russian agreement. This document of 1907

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Rose. II, ch. II and Appendices II and III.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Rose. II, p. 131. Busch: *Bismark*, II. p. 376.

<sup>21</sup> Jan. 30, 1902, P. P. Cd. 914, Treaty Series, No. 3. (1902). Aug. 12, 1905, P. P. Cd. 2735. Treaty Series No. 25. (1905).

deals with the situation in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet.<sup>22</sup> It is true that this engagement ratifies rather than alters the actual situation. Nevertheless, though not a bargain for serious future coöperation, it is an amicable recognition of respective interests. Of course, the interpretation of such an agreement may, at any stage, depend on force, and on the development of future policies. The general gain, however, over the Anglo-Russian situation which existed in 1880 is now both apparent and important. We may understand its fuller bearing in connection with our last topic, Anglo-German relations.

In 1880 Germany needed peace; and both England and Germany, as joint authors of the Treaty of Berlin, were of necessity charged with the enforcement of that treaty. A common policy was therefore apparently not impossible, especially as both powers had so recently incurred Russian hostility.<sup>23</sup> But Bismark hated parliamentary government; and he disliked and distrusted Mr. Gladstone;<sup>24</sup> in 1883 he declared British foreign policy had for three years "been an unbroken series of blunders."<sup>25</sup> Indeed, as early as 1884 a two-fold divergence between the two nations became evident. German colonial ambitions had at first met with cynical indifference by the British public; but later both British government and people showed an inefficient opposition toward German expansion.<sup>26</sup> Secondly, the emphatic testimony summarized by the report of the royal commission on the depression of British trade revealed the pregnant possibilities of economic competition.<sup>27</sup> On these two lines the main issues have since advanced. Nevertheless, until 1896, the year of the kaiser's telegram to President Kruger, the essentially peaceful policies of both England and Germany continued to postpone any significant changes. The general European situation, however, had changed. For nearly twenty years England in her "splendid isolation" had been apparently indifferent to the progress of alignment

<sup>22</sup> Aug. 31, 1907, P. P. Cd. 3750. Russia, No. 1 (1907).

<sup>23</sup> Fitzmaurice: *Granville*, II. p. 212, 225. *Bismark, the Man and the Statesman*, II, p. 240. Busch: *Bismark*. II. p. 396.

<sup>24</sup> Fitzmaurice: II. pp. 202, 208, 225, 233.

<sup>25</sup> Busch: *Bismark*, II, p. 344.

<sup>26</sup> P. P. Cd. 4265. South Africa, 1884-85. Derby to Robinson, Dec. 4, 1884. Fitzmaurice: *Granville*, II. ch. X.

<sup>27</sup> P. P., Cd. 4715. Second report of the royal commission on the depression of trade and industry, March 3, 1886, pp. 21, 43-44, 48-50, 54, 57, 64, 67-8, 119-22, 124-5, 128, 130, 140, 193, 221, 265, 283.



which had ranged, Germany, Austria and Italy on the one hand, and on the other, France and Russia. Here, surely, was an opportunity which Cardinal Wolsey would have utilized. But until recently British policies have shown no clear intention with regard to Germany. Thus there was in the first place an opportunity at the start for combination, from which the British government refrained. However, both powers later actually joined policies on various occasions, but not always to the ultimate advantage of Great Britain. Thus, in 1885, African affairs were settled by joint action;<sup>28</sup> in 1890 a bargain was struck as to Zanzibar and Heligoland,<sup>29</sup> and some years later the Samoan question was settled.<sup>30</sup> Agreements in 1900 as to China,<sup>31</sup> and in 1902 with reference to Venezuelan affairs, do not exhaust the list. Lastly the occasion came more than once for appreciation, on the part of the British, that German policies and behavior were at times distinctly hostile. To-day we can recall those lines of opposition and competition already shown twenty-five years ago. We must also remember the geographic and military significance for Germany of the Franco-Russian alliance. Thus can we speculate over the possibilities of the Anglo-French *entente*.

Furthermore, the Anglo-Russian agreement has recognized Russia's sphere of influence in Persia which is near the field of ambitious German development by means of the Bagdad railway. In the case of France, English agreement has already helped to raise the issue of German ventures in Morocco. May it not be possible that the Anglo-Russian agreement will affect German interests in Asia Minor and the Euphrates valley? Thus after nearly thirty years of Anglo-German relations no clear or continuous line of official action is evident. But while we are forced only occasionally to record expressions of official opposition, we must remember that governments cannot permanently control the economic ambitions or necessities of nations.

Here, then, as we look back we may see, from the point of view of party policies, a curious antithesis. After all, Disraeli had aimed at making British interests dominant in Egypt, South Africa and Afghanistan, but these aims, at one time or another, were threatened

<sup>28</sup> Berlin conference for African Affairs, Feb. 26, 1885, S. P., vol. 76, p. 4. Also pp. 58, 66 and 772.

<sup>29</sup> July 1, 1890, S. P., vol. 82, p. 35.

<sup>30</sup> Dec. 2, 1899, S. P., vol. 91, p. 75.

<sup>31</sup> Oct. 16, 1900, P. P., Cd. 365. China, No. 5. (1900).

by Gladstonian policies. Nevertheless, to-day England is happily director, if not master, in those regions. Yet is this entirely Disraeli's posthumous victory? Was Great Britain, was the empire really ready, in 1880, for Disraeli's programme? This liberal ministry, which was empowered in 1880, must have been an uneasy body. Individual members with difficulty restrained a tendency toward resignation, which threatened at times to become a habit.<sup>32</sup> But Mr. Gladstone always had a keen sense of relative values. Was it not, therefore, wise for him to try to hold his cabinet together in the face of divergent views, in order, at least, to attempt the realization of large policies? And now, looking both to the past and to the future, we can appreciate that opposition to aggressive policies, while it may not be popular, is nevertheless essential to free institutions. The ministry of 1880, whether consciously or not, was the brake on forces and tendencies which, if they were to be justly and finally successful, required at that time new guidance, a check, if not a halt. So to-day in any estimate of British success in these matters Gladstonian ideals must have a fair share.

But even larger questions remain. Irrespective of party policies or party leaders, can we not distinguish certain characteristics or tendencies of recent British policy? The facts here presented have been scanty; but on the basis not merely of what we have here recalled, but also of what we know, I judge that we can distinguish at least four tendencies. Since 1880, British foreign policy has been aggressive, possibly belligerent. It has stimulated the addition of large areas to the Empire, and has held in check by dramatic, if not always diplomatic means, both republican and imperial rivals. Yet secondly, it has been at times clearly a peaceful policy. Great struggles with European and American powers have been avoided. On occasion, a British government has preserved peace at the price of popularity. So the patient years show also a record of achievement in restraint. Thirdly, the cause of peace has been assisted by the process of elimination of disputes. This tendency has alleviated large, scattered yet recurrent, animosities. Thus many matters formerly pregnant with

<sup>32</sup> Robertson: *Bright*. p. 529. Childers: *Childers*, II. p. 222. Reid: *Forster*, p. 564. Argyle: *Autobiography* II, pp. 352, 377. Fitzmaurice: *Granville*, II., pp. 321-22, 380, 404, 421-22, Mallet: *Northbrook*, p. 194. Morley: *Gladstone*, III, pp. 65-66, 83-86, 174-75, 185-89, 200.

war have been settled with satisfaction to both sides.<sup>33</sup> This process of elimination may continue; at least its present success has been marked. And as a result we have seen rivals become friends. But elimination may after all be limited in scope. Alliance and combination can extend further; and in the last few years British isolation has ended. Fortunately, therefore, we have the policy of the *ententes*. Possibly under the inspiration of England, which already had an Asiatic alliance, a regrouping of the European powers has taken place. At least we can now realize that "masterly inactivity" and

<sup>33</sup> A brief selection from over 130 illustrations of this policy of elimination will underscore the importance of this tendency and reveal the wide range of British coöperation in endeavoring to settle dispute by treaty rather than by war. Agreements previously referred in this paper are here omitted.

April-June. 1885. Anglo-German arrangement concerning Spheres of Action: Africa (coast of Guinea; Cameroons; Victoria, Amba Bay; Santa Lucia Bay; Coast between Natal and Delagoa Bay; Customs, etc.) S. P., vol. 76, p. 772.

10 September, 1885. Anglo-Russian Protocol respecting the Afghan Frontier. S. P., vol. 77, p. 303.

6 April, 1886. Anglo-German Declaration for the Demarcation of Spheres of Influence in the Western Pacific. S. P., vol. 77, p. 42.

27 July-2 August, 1886. Agreement with Germany respecting Spheres of Action in the Gulf of Guinea. S. P., vol. 77, p. 1049.

29 October-1 November, 1886. Agreement with Germany respecting Zanzibar and Spheres of Influence in East Africa. S. P., vol. 77, p. 1130.

16 November, 1886. Anglo-French Convention concerning the New Hebrides. S. P., vol. 78, p. 545.

[2, 9] February, 1888. Anglo-French Agreement respecting the Somali Coast. S. P., vol. 83, p. 672.

[12, 20] June, 1888. Exchange of Notes with Russia relative to the Boundary of Afghanistan: Heri-Rud and Oxus. S. P., vol. 78, p. 388.

14 June, 1889. Final Act of the Samoan Conference of Berlin. Concluded with Germany and the United States. S. P., vol. 81, p. 1058.

11 May, 1891. Treaty with Portugal and Exchange of Notes respecting Spheres of Influence in Africa. S. P., vol. 83, pp. 27, 890.

20 June, 1891. Convention with the Netherlands respecting Boundaries in Borneo. S. P., vol. 83, p. 41.

29 February, 1892. Treaty with the United States providing for Arbitration of the Behring Sea Seal Fisheries Dispute. S. P., vol. 84, p. 48.

22 July, 1892. Boundary Convention with the United States respecting Alaska and Pasquamoddy Bay. S. P., vol. 84, p. 70.

8 July, 1893. Treaty with Mexico respecting the Boundary of British Honduras. S. P., vol. 85, p. 58.

25 November, 1893. Protocol and Agreement with France respecting the Intermediary Zone in Upper Mekong. S. P., vol., 85, pp. 35, 36.

"splendid isolation" have been, after all, the two sides to the same coin. And that coin apparently is now no longer current in Downing Street.

But such diversity of tendencies has, perhaps, encouraged some writers to call British policy opportunist. The present question is whether, in view of the particular international rivalry, of which to-day all men speak, this policy of elimination and of combination may not also be intentionally opportune. Is England in diplomatic affairs arranging a new code of signals and clearing the decks?

Yet all of us are thinking not only of such dread possibilities, or of the great Englishman whose birth we gladly celebrate today, but

1 March, 1894. Convention with China respecting Burmah and Tibet. S. P., vol. 87, p. 1311.

5 May, 1894. Anglo-Italian Protocol for the Demarcation of Spheres of Influence in Eastern Africa. S. P., Vol. 86, p. 55.

11 March, 1895. Agreement with Russia respecting Spheres of Influence in the Pamirs. S. P., Vol. 87., p. 15.

16 June, 1895. Convention with the Netherlands respecting Boundaries in New Guinea. S. P., vol. 87, p. 18.

15 January, 1896. Anglo-French Declaration respecting Siam, the Lower Niger, Tunis, etc. S. P. vol., 88, p. 13.

20 January, 1896. Agreement with Portugal for a Modus Vivendi respecting the Boundaries of Spheres of Influence north of the Zambesi. S. P., vol. 88, p. 5.

8 February, 1896. Convention with the United States for the Arbitration of Claims in the Behring Sea Seal Fishery. S. P., vol. 88, p. 8.

22 February, 1897. Treaty with Venezuela in the matter of the Boundary of British Guiana. S. P., vol. 89, p. 57.

3 October, 1899. Venezuelan Boundary Dispute Arbitration. S. P., vol. 92, p. 160.

14 November, 1899. Anglo-German Convention and Declaration respecting Samoa, West Africa, and Zanzibar. S. P., vol. 91, pp. 70, 74.

16 October, 1900. Anglo-German Agreement respecting China. Parliamentary Papers. Cd. 365. China, No. 5 (1900).

23 February, 1901. Anglo-German Agreement respecting Spheres of Interest between Lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika. P. P. Cd. 1007. Treaty Series, No. 8. (1902).

15 May, 1902. Treaties with Ethiopia, and with Ethiopia and Italy respecting Frontiers between the Soudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. P. P. Cd. 1370. Treaty Series, No. 16. (1902).

12 August, 1903. Anglo-Portuguese Declaration respecting Boundaries in Central Africa (Barotseland). P. P. Cd. 3731. Treaty Series, No. 28. (1907).

8 April, 1904. Anglo-French Declaration respecting Siam, Madagascar, New Hebrides (*Entente Cordiale*). P. P. Cd. 2385. Treaty Series, No. 9. (1906).

also of the significant parliamentary struggle which is so close. We can imagine with what enthusiasm Mr. Gladstone would have spent himself in these days. We must also consider whether, if the conservative party win, in the coming elections and enforces a protective tariff, the opportunities are not materially increased for friction between England and Germany.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, on turning home, as we recall the recent interested and enthusiastic talk of many Americans, we can also hope that a liberal victory would serve to enliven the essential sympathy of both peoples in the desperate and continuing battle for real democracy.

In conclusion, as we study both international questions and the present domestic problem in England, we can welcome the emphatic and triumphant declaration of Mr. Gladstone, made nearly sixty years ago, that it would

be a contravention of the law of nature and of God, if it were possible for any single nation of Christendom to emancipate itself from the obligations which bind all other nations, and to arrogate, in the face of mankind, a position of peculiar privilege.<sup>35</sup>

12 (25) November, 1904. Anglo-Russian Declaration relative to the North Sea Incident. P. P. Cd. 2328. Treaty Series, No. 13. (1904).

7 April, 1905. Anglo-French Agreement for the Arbitration of Newfoundland Fisheries' Disputes. P. P. Cd. 2737. France, No. 1. (1905).

29 May, 1906. Anglo-French Convention respecting the Niger Frontier. P. P. Cd. 3158. Treaty Series, No. 14 (1906).

16 August, 1906. Convention with the United States respecting the Canadian and Alaskan Boundary. P. P. Cd. 3159. Treaty Series, No. 15 (1906).

20 October, 1906. Anglo-French Convention respecting the New Hebrides. P. P. Cd. 3300. Treaty Series, No. 3 (1907).

16 May, 1907. Exchange of Notes with Spain maintaining the Status Quo in the Mediterranean and East Atlantic Ocean. P. P. Cd. 3576. Spain. No. 1 (1907).

6 December, 1907. Agreement with Ethiopia respecting Frontiers of British East Africa, Uganda, and Ethiopia. P. P. Cd. 4318. Treaty Series, No. 27 (1908).

11 April, 1908. Treaty with the United States for the Demarcation of the Canadian-American Boundary. P. P. Cd. 4139. Treaty Series, No. 18. (1908).

27 January, 1909. Anglo-American Agreement for Arbitration of the Fisheries Question. P. P. Cd. 4815. Treaty Series, No. 21 (1909).

22 February, 1909. 5 March, 1909. Exchange of Notes with Germany defining Boundaries in South Africa. P. P. Cd. 4699. Treaty Series, No. 17. (1909).

<sup>34</sup> Cf. for significant comment in Nov., 1884, as to German desire that England continue a policy of free trade: Busch: *Bismark*, II, p. 374.

<sup>35</sup> Hansard. 3d series, vol. 112, p. 586 (June 27, 1850).